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The Southeast Asian outbreak of the highly lethal avian influenza A
H5N1 infection in humans is unlikely to abate because of the enormous
number of backyard farms providing poultry as the main source of
food protein in developing countries. This increases the risk of the
emergence of a reassortant pandemic influenza virus with improved
human-to-human transmissibility. Currently triage of suspected cases
by epidemiological risk factors remains the only practical way of case
identification for laboratory investigation and infection control. The
clinical usefulness of rapid diagnostic laboratory tests requires more
vigorous evaluation. The lethality of this disease may reflect systemic
viral dissemination, cytokine storm, or alveolar flooding due to in-
hibition of cellular sodium channels. The present circulating genotype
Z is intrinsically resistant to amantadine and rimantadine. Prognosis
may be improved by early treatment with a neuraminidase inhibitor
with good systemic drug levels, and post-exposure prophylaxis for
health care workers is recommended. The role of immunomodulators
and other modalities of therapy requires evaluation in randomised
controlled trials, with prospective monitoring of the viral load and
cytokine profiles in various clinical specimens. In view of the high
fatality of the disease, a combination of contact, droplet, and airborne
precautions are recommended as long as resources allow despite the
fact that the relative importance of these three modes in nosocomial
transmission of avian influenza is still unknown.
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Introduction
Despite international efforts to contain the avian influenza epidemic that
is rampant in Southeast Asia since late 2004, sporadic cases of human
influenza A H5N1 infection are still being reported from time to time in
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the endemic countries. Failure to control avian
influenza infections in the domestic animals may
increase the risk of the emergence of a reassortant
pandemic influenza virus with improved human-
to-human transmissibility. The World Health
Organization (WHO) has advised all nations on
preparedness for an influenza pandemic in view of
the growing threat of avian influenza A H5N1 virus
in Southeast Asia. This review presents current know-
ledge on avian influenza A H5N1, including optimum
clinical management and public health measures.
Virology
Influenza A virus is a negative-sense, single-stranded
RNA virus, with an eight-segment genome encoding
10 proteins. It belongs to the family Orthomyxoviridae
which includes the genera of influenzavirus A, B, and
C as defined by the antigenicity of the nucleocapsid
and matrix proteins. Generally, influenza A virus is
associated with more severe disease in humans.
Influenza A virus is further subtyped by two surface
proteins—haemagglutinin (H) which attaches the
virion to the host cell for cell entry, and neuraminidase
(N) which facilitates the spread of the progeny virus
by cleaving the host sialic acid receptors attaching the
progeny virus.
Nomenclature and antigenic drift
There are 16 H subtypes1 and 9 N subtypes which
make up all subtypes of the influenza A virus by
various combinations of H and N. Infidelity of the RNA
polymerase and the selective pressure of host immunity
lead to the accumulation of mutations and change in
surface antigenicity of these surface proteins. This
antigenic change is called antigenic drift. Every year
in February, the WHO decides the strains of virus to
be used for the annual influenza vaccination in humans
by following this antigenic drift. The nomenclature of
the viral strain is written in the following order: type/
place of isolation/strain number/year of isolation
(subtype). Using the year 2005 as an example,2 the
WHO has recommended changing from influenza A/
Fujian/411/2003(H3N2) to A/California/7/2004(H3N2)
for vaccination purposes. Such changes are necessary
because the neutralising antibody titre of the general
population induced by the older vaccine strain will not be
sufficient to give good protection against the new strain.
Antigenic shift
All combinations of the 16 H and 9 N viral subtypes
are found in water fowl, whereas only H1 to 3 and N1
to 2 viral subtypes are commonly found in humans
with influenza. As a result of its segmented genome,
shuffling of gene segments can occur if two different
subtypes of influenza A virus infect the same cell. For
example, if a human H3N2 virus and an avian H5N1
virus co-infect a human or other member of a mam-
malian species, such an event can produce a novel
H5N2 virus. This novel virus can then be efficiently
transmitted from human to human because all or most
of the gene segments apart from H5 come from the
human virus. Such genetic reassortment would lead to
a major antigenic change, a so-called antigenic shift,
which would mean that most of the global population
would not have any effective neutralising antibodies
against the reassortant virus. Such a situation,
coupled with the high mortality of influenza A H5N1
pneumonia,3 is one of the most feared scenarios in the
field of public health.
Phylogenetic studies have shown that the 1957
pandemic H2N2 virus came from the circulating H1N1,
which acquired the H2, N2, and PB1 genes from avian
species. Similarly, the 1968 pandemic H3N2 virus
possibly came from the circulating H2N2 virus, which
acquired H3 and PB1 genes from avian species. It is
also possible that avian influenza A viruses undergo
significant genetic mutations inside human or mam-
malian cells and adapt sufficiently to be transmitted
from human to human. Alternatively, a human H3N2
virus that has undergone antigenic drift may acquire
some internal gene segments of the H5N1 virus (such
as NS1 or PB2) which may be associated with higher
virulence. Such reassortant viruses can be generated
in nature or in the laboratory by bioterrorists.4
Influenza pandemics
Ten influenza pandemics defined by clinical and
epidemiological records have occurred in the last 300
years, with an average of one per 33 years.5 Viral and
seroprevalence studies show that these pandemics were
caused by H1N1 (1977), H3N2 (1968), H2N2 (1957),
H1N1 (1918), possibly H3N8 (1900) and H2N2
(1889). The 1918 influenza pandemic was particularly
devastating, with an estimated global fatality rate of
20 to 40 million. Unlike the usual pattern of fatality
involving the very young and the old in the annual
influenza seasons or the recent pandemics, those aged
between 20 to 40 years were also badly affected.
Influenza epidemics are generally defined in terms
of increased deaths from influenza-like illness (ILI)
and pneumonia which is in excess of a pre-determined
norm for all seasons of the year. The excess deaths in
the United States were estimated to be 500 000 in 1918,
approximately 69 800 in 1957, and 33 800 in 1968.
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Influenza-associated deaths in the inter-pandemic years
have been cited as 21 000 per year.6 It is obvious that
resources must be allocated for preparedness against
such pandemics due to their enormous potential
medical and socio-economic impact.
Worrying aspects of the H5N1 virus
Most subtypes of influenza virus, such as H9, cause
very mild disease in poultry but the H5 and H7 subtypes
can inflict severe economic loss by causing outbreaks
involving massive deaths in domestic poultry. Sporadic
cases or outbreaks of zoonotically transmitted avian
influenza A virus to humans have been reported. The
majority of these cases were of acute conjunctivitis or
ILI caused by H7N7 or H9N2.7-10 There has been only
one fatal case of pneumonia caused by H7N7.7 The
1997 outbreak of H5N1 influenza in Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) involved 18
human cases, with six fatalities,11,12 raising significant
concern about the threat posed by the virus. Though
the outbreak was terminated by the massive culling of
1.5 million poultry in the HKSAR, the H5N1 virus
has since been isolated from poultry in an increasing
number of geographical locations, from southern China
to all of Southeast Asia and Japan. Table 1 summarises
the impact of avian influenza on humans and poultry
in the HKSAR.
Heralded by two imported human cases of H5N1
in the HKSAR in 2003,13 three waves of human disease,
affecting at least 88 people with 51 deaths have been
reported since 2004 in Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam,
giving an overall case-fatality rate of 58%.14 Moreover,
many genotypes of avian H5N1 have been found in a
4-year prospective surveillance study in southern
China.15,16 Over 20% of the poultry in southern China
were shown to be affected during the winter time. At
present the genotype Z is the dominant H5N1 virus.
This is associated with high pathogenicity in zoo and
laboratory mammals including tigers, leopards, do-
mestic cats, mice, cynomolgus monkeys, and ferrets.17-20
This genotype of the H5N1 virus appears to be quite
stable in the environment for up to 6 days and is resis-
tant to amantadine and rimantadine. Like the 1997
outbreak, there is epidemiological or serological
evidence of human-to-human transmission, though in
a relatively inefficient manner.21,22 It is notable that
none of the primary H5N1 cases in Thailand contracted
the virus in urban areas, where central slaughtering
has been practised for more than 30 years. An epidemi-
ological study in 1997 showed that the majority of
HKSAR cases had a history of contact with poultry.23,24
The present outbreak of H5N1 infections in poultry
and similarly in human is unlikely to cease in the near
future because of the huge number of backyard farms
in Southeast Asia. The proximity of humans to poultry
in these countries perpetuates the risk of human infec-
tion and that of the emergence of a reassortant or mutant
virus, with good transmissibility between humans.
Public health control
The basic reproductive number for influenza—the
number of secondary cases produced by one primary
case—varies from 1.68 to 20.25 In explosive outbreaks
with high basic reproductive numbers, airborne
transmission by respiratory droplet nuclei of less than
5 µm in diameter is likely, whereas in outbreaks with a
low reproductive number, infection control by droplet
precautions alone may be sufficient since the large
droplet will settle within 1 m from the coughing or
sneezing patient. At the initial or indeterminate stage,
when the severity of illness and reproductive number
of the impending pandemic are still unknown, and
when resources are not yet overstretched, any patient
with suspected avian influenza infection should be
nursed with airborne precautions. If the basic
reproductive number is around 3, as in the case of
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), there is
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Table 1. Impact of avian influenza on humans and poultry in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region*
* Data accessed from Department of Health, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
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still a possibility of stopping a pandemic by isolation
and quarantine. Unlike SARS patients whose viral
shedding and infectious status peaks at around day 10,
substantial transmission of pandemic influenza virus
may occur before the onset of symptoms. Viral
shedding by patients with influenza starts within
24 hours before the onset of symptoms and peaks
within 48 hours afterwards. Therefore, community-
wide measures that reduce contacts between persons
irrespective of symptom status may be the most im-
portant preventive measure before the availability of
sufficient and effective antiviral agents or vaccine.
Transmission
Infected droplets may settle on conjunctival,
nasopharyngeal, or other respiratory mucosal
epithelium. The haemagglutinin of human influenza
A virus will adhere to the alpha-2,6-linked sialic acid
receptor which is the predominant type of sialic acid
receptor on the surface of human respiratory
epithelium. Attachment is followed by endocytosis and
fusion of the viral and cell membrane, leading to entry
of the virus into the cytoplasm. The H subtypes of
avian influenza A virus (such as the H5N1, H9N2, or
H7N7 subtypes) will preferentially attach to the alpha-
2,3-linked sialic acid receptor present on the respiratory
and alimentary epithelium of birds, but also on human
conjunctiva and the ciliated portion of human re-
spiratory pseudostratified columnar epithelium.26 This
finding may partly explain why these avian viruses
can overcome the species barrier and cause human
infections. Moreover, during the late phase of infection,
ciliated human respiratory epithelial cells are
permissive to both human and avian virus infection,
which allows the potential for genetic reassortment of
avian and human viruses.
As the respiratory epithelium of pigs contains both
the alpha-2,6 and alpha-2,3 sialic acid receptors, pigs
can be infected by both human and avian influenza
viruses. Since pigs live in close proximity to humans
and poultry in family backyards in Southeast Asia,
they can theoretically serve as the ‘mixing vessel’
for gene reassortment between avian influenza virus
and human influenza virus. Therefore, rearing of pigs
in close proximity to poultry is to be avoided in order
to minimise this risk.27 It is important to remember
that H1 and H3 viral subtypes are prevalent in pigs.28
Cellular pathogenesis and viral virulence
Once the virus enters the cell, the synthesis of the
host protein is shut off by several mechanisms, such
as the degradation of host mRNA by the viral cap
endonuclease. The loss of critical host cell proteins
leads to cell death by necrosis. Cell death by apoptosis
may also occur due to Fas antigen induced by double-
stranded RNA produced during viral replication. The
unusual severity of H5N1 infection in humans was
initially attributed to the presence of multiple basic
amino acids around the cleavage site of the hae-
magglutinin.29 The cleavage process is essential for
fusion between the viral envelope and the host cell
membrane during entry of the virus into the host
cytoplasm. The presence of these basic amino acids
renders the protein susceptible to proteases from many
different types of tissues and allows extrapulmonary
dissemination due to broadened tissue tropism. An
initial animal study suggested that amino acid
substitution at position 627 of PB2 may affect
replication efficiency or the severity of infection in a
mice model.30 However, when different animals and
H5N1 strains were used, it became apparent that the
virulence of the H5N1 virus depends on a constellation
of genetic changes rather than a change in a single gene
product.18 For human isolates of H5N1 in particular,
the non-structural protein NS1 was shown to anta-
gonise the antiviral effect of interferon and tumour
necrosis factor–alpha (TNF-α) produced by infected
cells as an innate defence against viral infection.31
Moreover, human H5N1 isolates are more potent than
human H3N2 or H1N1 subtypes in the induction of
pro-inflammatory cytokines, such as interferon-
γ-inducible protein-10 (IP10) and TNF-α, in primary
human macrophage cells.32 This may lead to a cytokine
storm and death without extrapulmonary viral
dissemination.13 Recent studies have also shown that
attachment by the haemagglutinin of the influenza
virus onto the respiratory epithelium can cause
rapid inhibition of epithelial sodium channels,
leading to oedema. This may exacerbate influenza-
mediated alveolar flooding and early acute respiratory
failure.33,34
Clinical disease
Asymptomatic or mildly symptomatic infection by the
H5N1 virus is possible as shown by the seroprevalence
study undertaken in the HKSAR after the 1997
outbreak.35,36 It is likely that the 18 HKSAR patients
with documented H5N1 disease represented only the
more severe cases requiring hospitalisation. The main
presenting complaint was high or persistent fever in
most reported cases, while those with severe underlying
medical illness had an exacerbation of their general
debility. The initial clinical syndromes seen included:
acute community-acquired pneumonia; ILI; upper
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respiratory infections, such as acute rhinitis, con-
junctivitis (though this presentation appears to be less
commonly seen than in infections caused by influenza
A H7N7),12 and pharyngitis; an acute gastroenteritis-
like syndrome with diarrhoea, vomiting, and abdominal
pain11,37; and acute encephalitis with impaired con-
sciousness and seizures.38 Subsequently, many of those
presenting with community-acquired pneumonia
progressed to acute respiratory distress syndrome
(Fig 1), or multiple organ dysfunction syndrome
(MODS), and Reye’s syndrome was seen in a young
child who had received aspirin. The HKSAR
experience in 1997 suggested that patients aged below
6 years usually had self-limiting, acute respiratory
disease associated with fever, rhinorrhoea, and sore
throat, with or without gastrointestinal symptoms. The
children responded to supportive care and usually
became afebrile within 48 hours of admission. The
exception was the 3-year-old boy who had received
aspirin, the first patient infected by the H5N1 virus in
1997, who subsequently died. Of the 28 Southeast
Asian cases confirmed by WHO with demographic
information available on the web, only three were aged
6 years or less.39
Most patients who presented with community-
acquired pneumonia had a more severe clinical course
requiring oxygen therapy or intensive care as compared
with patients who presented with ILI. The case-fatality
rate for H5N1 infection in HKSAR in 1997 is 33% for
all cases and 55% for those with pneumonia. These
patients were generally adults. The major radiographic
abnormalities seen included extensive infiltration
bilaterally, lobar collapse, focal consolidation, and air
bronchograms.3 A radiographic pattern of interstitial
lung infiltrates was also reported but less com-
monly.40 Radiological and clinical deterioration was
rapid. Comparing the seven cases of uncomplicated
ILI in the HKSAR in 1997 with the 11 cases of
community-acquired pneumonia seen, patients with
community-acquired pneumonia were significantly
older, had lower total peripheral white blood cell
counts, were more often lymphopenic, and more often
had a fatal outcome. Over 60% of patients with
Fig 1. Chest radiographs of a patient with influenza A H5N1 infection
(a) bilateral primary influenza pneumonitis was seen on presentation; (b) the radiographical appearance 5 days later
showed acute respiratory distress syndrome, with complete involvement of both lungs
Radiographs courtesy to Dr Edward Ho, Intensive Care Unit, Yan Chai Hospital
(a) (b)
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pneumonia had deranged liver function tests or
gastrointestinal symptoms such as vomiting, diarrhoea,
or abdominal pain, and one third had impaired renal
function. Lymphopenia and liver dysfunction were
present on initial presentation but renal dysfunction
was seen as a late event. Some patients also had
thrombocytopenia and prolonged clotting times. In a
report of 10 cases from Vietnam, a reversed CD4+/CD8+
ratio was observed in all five tested patients.3 Impaired
glycaemic control was reported in six of these patients
but methylprednisolone had been given to seven
patients. None of the HKSAR patients had evidence
of rhabdomyolysis, myocarditis, or encephalitis but
the recent Southeast Asian outbreak had one case
of virologically confirmed encephalitis.38 All six
HKSAR patients of 1997 who died had MODS and
acute respiratory distress syndrome. Three had
evidence of haemophagocytosis on bone marrow
examination. Medical co-morbidities were not
significantly more common in those with more severe
disease in the HKSAR outbreak. Two patients with
mild ILI had a ventricular septal defect and glucose-
6-phosphate dehydrogenase deficiency respectively.
Four patients with severe disease had the following
respective co-morbidities: active systemic lupus
with immunosuppressive therapy, histiocytosis X,
electrocardiographic evidence of an old myocardial
infarct, and malignant thymoma treated with
radiotherapy 10 years previously.
Pathology
Three postmortem examinations have been reported
on patients in the HKSAR. Two were performed 1
month after the onset of illness,41 and one in 2003 at
day 10 after the onset of illness.13 Histopathological
examination in the latter patient showed alveolar
oedema, haemorrhage, fibrin exudation, alveolar
infiltration with CD68+ macrophages, interstitial
infiltration of CD3+ lymphocytes, and type-2
pneumocyte hyperplasia with increased expression
of TNF-α. Reactive haemophagocytosis was also
observed in the hyperplastic bone marrow and in the
parafollicular areas of the bronchial and hilar lymph
nodes.13 The histopathological changes seen in the
postmortems carried out 1 month after onset of illness
included organising, diffuse alveolar damage, with
interstitial fibrosis; hepatic central lobular necrosis;
acute renal tubular necrosis; and lymphoid depletion.
Viral antigen detection or reverse transcription–
polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) did not suggest
extrapulmonary viral disease.41
A prospective study of the serial serum cytokine
profiles was not completed but a higher serum
concentration of IP10 and monokine induced by
interferon-γ (MIG) was noted between day 6 and day
8 of the illness in one patient with a fatal outcome,
whereas these markers decreased by day 5 of the
illness in a patient who survived the disease.13 The
two postmortem cases in the HKSAR in 1997 had
elevated serum interleukin-6, interferon-γ, and soluble
interleukin-2 receptor levels.41 The initial working
hypothesis was that H5N1 viral infection in the
respiratory tract induced interferons and TNF-α as
early response cytokines that triggered a cascade of
other cytokines, including IP10 (a macrophage chemo-
attractant), MIG (induced by interferon-γ secreted by
activated T lymphocytes), interleukin-6, and others.
This was thought to explain the local and systemic
inflammatory response syndromes in the absence of
systemic viral dissemination. However, a recent case
report has suggested that the virus can be cultured from
the serum, cerebrospinal fluid, and stool in addition to
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Table 2. Diagnostic tests for avian influenza infection in humans*
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the respiratory secretions.38 This was not an altogether
unexpected finding as comprehensive virological
screening by culture and RT-PCR from various body
sites was not performed in the two 1997 postmortem
cases and postmortem tissues were only available at a
late stage of the illness. In infected poultry, laboratory
and zoo animals, such as mice, ferrets, tigers and
leopards, evidence of viral infection has been found in
extrapulmonary sites, including the central nervous
system.17,42 The relative importance of virus-induced
cytolysis and host immunopathological damage can
only be determined by a prospective longitudinal study.
This would evaluate the viral load and cytokines in various
clinical specimens serially collected throughout the
course of the illness, in the absence of intervention with
antivirals or immunomodulators. Such a study would
also assist in ascertaining possible modes of transmission
and the period of communicability of this disease.
Laboratory diagnostics
A summary of the reported diagnostic tests for avian
influenza infection in humans is presented in Table 2.
A positive culture for H5N1 virus in Madin-Darby
canine kidney cell line or chick embryo allantoic
sac inoculated with a properly collected clinical
specimen remains the gold standard for the definitive
diagnosis of this disease. The low number of cases
and lack of systematic collection of clinical
specimens has precluded proper evaluation of culture
Fig 2. Management of patients with suspected avian influenza A H5N1
Patients with suspected avian
influenza A H5N1
Respiratory syndrome of
influenza-like illness (ILI) or
community-acquired
pneumonia (CAP)
Positive contact history (1)
• Hospital admission
• Hospital infection-
control measures (2)
• Workup for H5N1
infection
• Oseltamivir preferably
within 48 hours of onset
• Avoid aspirin
• Empirical treatment of
CAP according to
standard regimens
ILI
• Out-patient follow-up
± chest X-ray if
deteriorates
• Personal hygiene (3)
• May consider
oseltamivir for
documented influenza
• Avoid aspirin
Mild CAP
No contact history
CAP
(1) Includes history of contact with dead or sick birds, family members with suspected or confirmed H5N1 infection, health
care workers of suspected or confirmed patients with H5N1 infection, laboratory workers handling specimens or viral
cultures of H5N1 viruses. For patients with only a history of travel to endemic areas, need to individualise according to
risk assessment.
(2) Includes contact and droplet precautions; whenever possible, airborne precautions for those patients with confirmed
H5N1 infection. Oxygen therapy by nasal cannula; avoid high-flow oxygen mask or nebulisers to reduce risk of
aerosolisation. If the use of high-flow oxygen mask or other aerosol-generating procedures is essential, strict airborne
precautions should be instituted.
(3) Includes wearing standard surgical mask at home, frequent handwashing.
Moderate-to-severe CAP
• Standard first-line
antibiotics for CAP, eg
amoxicillin-clavulanate
• Out-patient follow-up ±
chest X-ray
• Personal hygiene (3)
• Standard antibiotic
regimens for severe
CAP, eg third-generation
cephalosporins +
macrolide; quinolones if
allergic to beta lactams
• Intensive care +
mechanical ventilation if
necessary; infection-
control precautions (2)
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and various rapid diagnostic tests, such as RT-PCR
and antigen detection by enzyme immunoassay or
immunofluorescent tests. Our experience in 1997
suggested that RT-PCR is superior to antigen detection
in both sensitivity and specificity. If the direct antigen
detection test is for influenza A, a positive detection
of H5 antigen or RNA and a negative detection of H1
and H3 by either specific monoclonal antibodies or
RT-PCR would strongly suggest a diagnosis of H5
infection. It is important to remember that the commercial
immunochromatographic membrane enzyme immuno-
assay tests are not specific for H5 and only has a sen-
sitivity of 70% when compared with viral culture. There-
fore, a negative test does not exclude influenza A
infection and a positive test does not confirm the diag-
nosis of H5 infection. There was an impression that
the viral load in H5N1 infection was relatively low—
in the order of 31.6 copies of the M gene per µL in a
nasopharyngeal specimen collected between day 5 to
10 of illness—compared with that of human influenza.
However, in a recent case report, the viral load was
estimated at 85 (serum), 64 (cerebrospinal fluid), 180
(throat swab), and 98 (rectal swab) copies of M gene
per µL.38 Nasopharyngeal aspirate or bronchoalveolar
lavage followed by nasopharyngeal swab or throat swab
placed in viral transport medium should be collected with
airborne precautions (see below) in patients suspected to
have this infection. A stool or rectal swab placed in viral
transport medium should also be considered in sus-
pected cases presenting with diarrhoea. Serum and
cerebrospinal fluid should be collected in those with
encephalitis. If the patient survives the infection, a 4-fold
rise in neutralising antibody titre between the acute and
convalescent sera is also diagnostic of the infection.43
Unfortunately, the microneutralisation test requires
the use of a virus of similar antigenic lineage, often the
circulating virulent genotype, which necessitates the
test being performed in biosafety level 3 laboratories.
The results of the microneutralisation test can also be
confirmed by a Western blot assay using baculovirus-
expressed recombinant H5 antigen.44
Clinical management
During the initial stage of the illness, clinical
examination cannot accurately differentiate H5N1
infection from other causes of community-acquired
pneumonia, ILI, acute gastroenteritis, and acute
encephalitis. Epidemiological markers such as TOCC
(Travelling history to endemic areas; Occupation:
poultry, laboratory or health care workers; Contact
history with poultry, dead or sick bird or H5N1
patients; and Clustering of infection) should be used
to triage patients for isolation, early empirical treatment
with oseltamivir and laboratory investigations (Fig 2).
Good evidence from randomised placebo-controlled
trials is not available for the use of antivirals or im-
munomodulators in H5N1 infections. Aspirin must be
avoided to prevent Reye’s syndrome, especially in those
younger than 16 years but this complication has also
been reported rarely in adults.45 Respiratory support and
intensive care remain the most important aspects of
clinical management during the acute stage of the
pneumonic illness. Pneumothorax has been reported
when patients were placed on mechanical ventilation.40
To avoid barotrauma and further lung injury, a lung-
protected ventilation strategy should be considered.
Data from gene sequencing of genotype Z of the
H5N1 virus has identified an asparagine residue at
position 31 of the M2 protein, which is invariably
associated with resistance to amantadine and
rimantadine.16 Both neutralisation tests in cell culture
and a mice model have shown that the neuraminidase
inhibitors, oseltamivir and zanamivir, appear effective
against the virus. However, the mortality in infected
mice was seen to increase with the duration of delay
in administering the neuraminidase inhibitor.46 Five
of six reported patients died despite the use of oselt-
amivir at or after 6 days of illness.3,13 The high mortality
may reflect the lack of in-vivo efficacy, or delayed
treatment. Therefore, antiviral therapy must be given
as early as possible, as is the case with human influenza
where clinical efficacy is maximal if given within 48
hours of onset of illness. Oseltamivir is usually given
at a dosage of 75 mg orally twice daily for 5 days, and
zanamivir given at 10 mg inhaled twice daily for 5
days. A higher dose of oseltamivir of 150 mg orally
twice daily has been suggested and used in some
clinical trials.47 The use of a higher dose of oseltamivir
is associated with a larger reduction in viral load in
respiratory secretions, as well as a shorter duration of
illness in human influenza infections. However, there
is currently no evidence that this higher dose of
oseltamivir equates with a significant clinical
advantage over the standard dosage.48-50 Whether
higher doses of oseltamivir might be of benefit in avian
influenza requires further investigation. A higher dose
of oseltamivir should be considered in the group of
patients with very severe disease and especially those
having diarrhoea (which may impair drug absorption)
or immunosuppressed patients (including the very
young and very old) who may have a high initial viral
load. The duration of treatment should also be ex-
tended to 2 weeks since neutralising antibodies appear
much later in patients infected with H5N1 than
human influenza viruses. This is because most humans
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do not have prior exposure to H5N1 and therefore
immunological memory against cross-reacting antigens
is absent. Zanamivir has little systemic absorption and
may not be useful if extrapulmonary dissemination
has occurred but can still be considered for post-
exposure prophylaxis or early treatment in compliant
patients with no underlying pulmonary disease.51
Although zanamivir has not been FDA-approved for
prophylaxis against influenza, meta-analyses of
clinical trials have shown that it is highly effective as
a prophylactic agent for human influenza.52 Further
clinical trials may serve to confirm the role of zana-
mivir as a prophylactic agent against human and avian
influenza infections.
Chemoprophylaxis has been recommended for
health care workers or other personnel who might have
been exposed to the highly pathogenic avian influenza
viruses. In view of the widespread resistance to
amantadine, neuraminidase inhibitors are currently
the drugs of choice for this purpose. The present WHO
recommendation suggests giving oseltamivir 75 mg
orally once a day for at least 7 days, starting as soon as
possible after exposure.53 In addition to post-exposure
prophylaxis, vaccination against human influenza
viruses is also recommended for at-risk personnel, such
as health care workers, field investigators, and poultry
workers who might come into contact with avian
influenza viruses.53,54 Although this does not protect
the workers against avian influenza, this may
theoretically reduce the possibility of genetic
reassortment between human and avian influenza
viruses in the same human host.
The use of RNA interference is a novel approach to
antiviral therapy.55 This technique involves the use of
small interfering RNA (siRNA) molecules, which mediate
degradation of viral mRNA by cellular enzymes. RNA
interference has been studied for a number of viruses
including influenza viruses.56,57 In-vivo efficacy of this
approach in prevention and treatment of influenza has
been demonstrated in animal models.57,58 Optimisation
of target sequences and delivery systems may allow
future clinical trials of siRNA in humans.
At the stage of acute respiratory distress syndrome
and MODS, it is tempting to try immunomodulators.
However, six of the seven reported patients treated with
the immunomodulator methylprednisolone died.3 This
again suggests that the indication, choice, and dose of
immunomodulators should be investigated in the setting
of a randomised controlled trial. If the viral load could be
effectively reduced by early antiviral therapy, the systemic
inflammatory response due to cytokines may corre-
spondingly be reduced. It is important to remember
that interferons and TNF-α produced by patients are
important suppressors of viral replication. It would be
counter-productive if the immune defence against viral
replication is impaired by immunomodulators, while
antiviral therapy is not optimised. Concomitant
monitoring of the cytokine profile and viral load would
be an important component of clinical trials.
Hospital infection control
The most important route of acquisition of H5N1
infection is through contact with infected birds or their
excreta. However, hospital-acquired infection by
H5N1 virus was evident in a retrospective cohort study
comparing H5N1 seropositivity in health care workers
exposed to patients with H5N1 disease with unexposed
controls.35 Health care workers exposed to patients with
H5N1 infection were more likely to be seropositive to
the H5N1 virus and this difference could not be attrib-
uted to differences in exposure to poultry. Two health
care workers with unprotected exposure to virologically
documented cases were seropositive. One developed
a mild flu-like illness but no virus could be cultured.
The route of infection from avian influenza–infected
patients to health care workers is uncertain, although
it would be reasonable to presume that inhalation of
infective respiratory secretions (including large
droplets and droplet nuclei) and/or contact with virus-
laden secretions could be responsible. This is in line
with the most common routes of infection for human
influenza viruses, namely via droplets and contact with
mucous membranes.59-61 Therefore, in addition to
standard precautions, droplet and contact precautions
are the cornerstones in hospital infection control for
avian influenza–infected patients. Nevertheless, epide-
miological and animals studies have shown that air-
borne transmission is possible for human influenza,59-61
although there is much less conclusive evidence
compared to other diseases, such as tuberculosis. It
has been suggested that airborne transmission might
explain the sometimes explosive nature of human
influenza epidemics. Avian influenza to date has not
been shown to be efficiently transmitted from person
to person, and it would be impossible to predict when
the avian influenza viruses would acquire the potential
for efficient interpersonal spread. Presumably because
of this consideration, and the high case-fatality rate of
the disease, the WHO and Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention both have recommended airborne
precautions, in addition to standard, contact, and
droplet precautions, in the care of patients infected by
avian influenza viruses.53,62 This may necessitate
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resources not always available in developing countries.
However, it is still advisable to care for in-patients
with suspected or documented avian influenza A
H5N1 infections with airborne precautions as far as
practicable. The period of communicability of H5N1
infection is not well studied but can last for 3 weeks in
young children.53 Laboratory-acquired infections by
avian H7N7 but not H5N1 virus have been reported.63
Therefore, all health care and laboratory workers
should comply strictly with infection control and
laboratory biosafety procedures.
Conclusion
The high case-fatality rate of the present avian in-
fluenza epidemic in Southeast Asia is alarming. This,
together with the propensity of influenza viruses to
undergo genetic reassortment and mutation, makes the
avian influenza virus a likely candidate for the next
human influenza pandemic. The prospect of control
appears to be somewhat grim in the endemic rural parts
of Southeast Asia where modern biosecurity measures
are not easily implemented to control the transmission
of the avian viruses among and between different
animal species. Human vaccination at this stage is not
a viable way to minimise or control the threat. The
neuraminidase inhibitors remain the only group of
compounds effective for the treatment of avian in-
fluenza infections. Although avian influenza is a
treatable disease from the antiviral point of view, the
therapeutic efficacy of currently available antivirals
appears to rely on their use early in the course of the
illness. This is a significant impediment in developing
countries because patients are unlikely to present to
hospital within the first 48 hours if the disease initially
manifests as an ILI. Even if the patient presents to
health care facilities, the ability of facilities to provide
specific and rapid diagnosis for H5N1 infection
remains limited in rural areas. Therefore, apart from
research on vaccine and antiviral development, more
effort should also be put into the development of rapid
diagnostic tests that are sensitive, specific, and above
all, affordable for developing countries.64
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